Latvia files a declaration of intervention in the proceedings under Article 63 of the Statute
THE HAGUE, 22 July 2022. Genocide – On 21 July 2022, the Republic of Latvia, invoking Article 63 of the Statute of the Court, filed in the Registry of the Court a declaration of intervention in the case concerning Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation).
Pursuant to Article 63 of the Statute, whenever the construction of a convention to which States other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, each of these States has the right to intervene in the proceedings. In this case, the construction given by the judgment of the Court will be equally binding upon them.
To avail itself of the right of intervention conferred by Article 63 of the Statute, Latvia relies on its status as a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide Convention”). It states that “[a]s a Party to the Genocide Convention, Latvia has a direct interest in the construction that might be placed upon that treaty in the Court’s decision in the [proceedings”, indicating that it “wishes to intervene in order to make submissions on [the] construction of the Genocide Convention on issues relating to merits as well as jurisdiction”.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Rules of Court, Ukraine and the Russian Federation have been invited to furnish written observations on Latvia’s declaration of intervention.
Latvia’s declaration of intervention will soon be available on the Court’s website.
The history of the proceedings can be found in press releases Nos. 2022/4, 2022/6, 2022/7 and 2022/11, available on the Court’s website.
Note. The Court’s press releases are prepared by its Registry for information purposes only and do not constitute official documents.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was established by the United Nations Charter in June 1945 and began its activities in April 1946. The Court is composed of 15 judges elected for a nine-year term by the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. The seat of the Court is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). The Court has a twofold role. first, to settle, in accordance with international law, through judgments which have binding force and are without appeal for the parties concerned, legal disputes submitted to it by States; and, second, to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized United Nations organs and agencies of the system.
On July 4, Pope Francis announced that he had the intention to visit Moscow and Kyiv as soon as possible. The head of the Vatican is regularly speaking to Ukrainian President Zelensky but would like to visit Putin before heading toward Kyiv. He believes that he might be the neutral agent that could convince Putin to put an end to the war.
On the other side of the line, in Moscow, there are different reactions to this idea. In the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, most are in favour of such a visit. Even in the Presidential administration, the reaction is pretty positive, and they view this controversial proposal favourably. But that is not the case within the FSB and the military. There, it is another story, and the intervention of Francis is viewed with at least suspicion and more usually with complete reluctance.
The main actor of this diplomatic move is the head of the World Union of Old Believers Leonid Sevastianov. Sevastianov has access to the Pope and is highly considered by him, and is the one whom the Supreme Pontiff would listen to when it comes to Russia. He is also the one lobbying the Presidential administration in Russia, pushing the idea that the Vatican is the only “neutral” State and then the only one in a position to act as a genuine mediator. Leonid Sevastianov is a strong Christian, who strongly believes that his spiritual mission is to do all in his power to put an end to the war.
But the fiercer opposition is coming from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) Moscow Patriarch Kirill. Kirill is a strong supporter of the war, and justifies it, as several religious leaders in Russia, by the need of protecting the Christian world from the decadent West corrupted by cults and pagans, a message that is embraced by the Kremlin. His biggest fear is to see the Pope coming into his “territory”, preaching for peace. Even before the war, Kirill opposed the coming of the Vatican’s head, and the reason was then clear: Kirill is poorly considered by the believers, and barely attracts none (or very few) when he publicly appears. If Pope Francis would come to Russia, it’s likely that he attracts thousands of Christians to greet him, which would definitely undermine Kirill’s image in the country.
So Kirill is activating his network behind the scene to prevent Sevastianov to succeed, which is not without risk for the latter. Kirill is a former agent of the KGB and does not back off from dirty tricks to reach his goals. Sevastianov, who in fact is a former colleague of Kirill, and worked for years as the director of the St. Gregory the Theologian’s Charity Foundation, the biggest Orthodox Foundation in Moscow founded by Kirill and Metropolitan Hilarion, has recently declared that the support of the Moscow Patriarch to the war was to be considered as heresy, from a religious point of view. That’s no shy statement by far.
Hilarion himself, who was considered the number 2 of the ROC and was the chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, has recently been demoted and sent to a small diocese in Hungary. There is no clear interpretation of this demotion: some say that Hilarion was opposed to the war and was punished for that. Others say that Kirill saw him as a threat as he was in a position to replace him as Patriarch, and some say that it is to have him in a better position to lobby for the ROC on the international scene after Kirill has been sanctioned by the UK, and barely avoided the EU sanctions thanks to the last-minute intervention of Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary.
Nevertheless, if Sevastianov’s diplomacy is a risky one for himself, it is also a steady one. Sevastianov has kept pushing for it since February, gained the support of the Supreme Pontiff and is now making progress in Moscow. Of course, even if he would succeed in getting Francis to Moscow, the big question is will it have any impact on Vladimir Putin? History will tell.
In a time where peace has become more than the lack of war, war has hit what is considered the “civilized” world, there are few who willingly misinterpret the time, context, and text to justify the killing of other human beings, forgetting all lessons learned from history.
What is religion?
Religion is a social and cultural system that includes predetermined behaviours and rituals, morals, world-views, books, holy locations, prophecies, ethics, and organizations. It connects humans to mystical or spiritual components of the supernatural world. Religion is a combination of religious attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours that can be personal or institutionalized.
The different types of religions
There are many religions in the world, but we will only discuss the six major religions in this text. Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, Scientology and Hinduism are the 7 of the most known religions. We’ll look at each religion’s scriptural views about peace and the importance thereof.
Buddhism
Buddhism, unlike the first four religions, does not believe in an external God. Buddhists, on the other hand, seek personal enlightenment and adhere to the teachings of Buddha, a former prince who attained enlightenment after renouncing his life of luxury. According to Buddhists, the Four Noble Truths were discovered by Buddha.
Peace, according to Buddhism, is an inner condition of mental tranquillity that flows outward. Attaining a level of inner calm could serve as an example for everyone. Meditation helped Buddha achieve inner serenity, which encouraged him to work for world peace.
Christianity
Photo by Daniele Franchi
Christians adhere to the Christian faith. Christianity is one of the six major faiths. Christians, like Jews and Muslims, believe in one God: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. They study the Bible and attempt to follow Jesus Christ’s teachings. Churches are where the vast majority of Christians worship.
The Old Testament‘s definition of “peace” largely alludes to completeness, total health, and total welfare. It refers to the totality of God’s benefits bestowed on a member of the covenant community.
This is what the Bible says about peace in its verses. “I leave my peace with you; I give you my peace.” I do not give to you as the world does. Don’t let your hearts be worried, and don’t be terrified. “As a result, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, because we have been justified by faith.”
Hinduism
Hinduism, like Buddhism, is an Indian religion that is not monotheistic. Rather, it is based on a set of traditions and beliefs that were not established by a single person.
Hinduism emphasizes the importance of peace. Because of the eschatological implications, peace is not only necessary within oneself in Hinduism, but it is also extremely important to act peacefully toward others.
Islam
Muslims are people who adhere to the Islamic religion. They believe in the power of Allah, the Arabic word for God, which is another monotheistic faith. Muslims adhere to Islam’s five pillars, read the Qur’an, and pray in mosques.
Peace in Islam is defined as submission to Allah’s will through sharia, Allah’s holy and eternal rule, and the expansion of the Dar al-Islam, or ‘House of Islam,’ to encompass the entire globe. In the absence of sharia, there is no peace. Muslims believe that the only way to acquire inner peace is to completely surrender to Allah.
Judaism
The earliest religious group, Judaism, is the first of these world faiths. Jews believe in a single, all-powerful God who has made a specific deal with people, known as a covenant. To thank God for His protection and direction, Jews devote their lives to following God’s laws.
The Hebrew Bible mentions the well-known commandment to “love thy neighbour as thyself,” which is echoed throughout Judaism’s sacred literature. As a matter of fact, one of the primary concepts of Jewish law is the love of peace and the pursuit of peace.
In Judaism, peace is a very important belief. Jews will greet one another with the Hebrew phrase “Shalom,” which means “peace and happiness.” It evokes feelings of happiness and well-being. Within Judaism, peace between man and God, as well as between organizations and individuals, is highly valued and must be practised.
Scientology
The one that is considered probably the newest world religion due to its fast growth is Scientology, founded by American author L. Ron Hubbard, who is very well known also for his secular work in drug rehabilitation, values and education. It is in one of his fiction books (Battlefield Earth) that we find a very interesting call for Peace.
HEAR ME!!Out of a hell of shot and shell,// Out of this chaos of contention,// Let us bring peace to pointless fight.// Why do we court the whore called war?// Why make of Earth a shattered night?// There is no ecstasy in killing.// Love alone can make man willing.// So hear me warriors, hear me mothers.// There is no pay in slaughtered brothers. Attention, if your sense is fair,// heed that which we now declare.// PEACE! You races far and wide. PEACE!// Abandon your blood-soaked suicide// and now abide in peace!// Echo me!// As in your hearts you yearn for love, not death!// PEACE, we have declared it.// Snarls and strife must be at end!// In peace alone can this Earth mend.// And now find ecstasy in love, love for Earth, for all.// The gods of peace have now spoken.// OBEY!
Sikhism
Sikhism, founded by Guru Nanak, is another religion that believes in a single God. Sikhs believe that there is only one God, who is present everywhere and in all things.
They don’t really believe that war is always sinful, but that it should only be used as a last resort. As Guru Nanak, Guru Arjan, and Guru Tegh Bahadur demonstrated, peaceful techniques include discussion and non-violence.
Conclusion
Religious tolerance is an important component of every peaceful community, and religious freedom is a global human right that all countries must protect. It is critical to respect one’s religion. No one should be judged because it is everyone’s right to worship whatever they believe in.
Interview: How I welcomed refugees – “Schools should be on the frontline of the full integration” – An interview with a teacher of a secondary school in Lisbon who gave asylum to a family of seven Ukrainian refugees. How easy (or difficult) is it to welcome a family of refugees? What can we do to help Ukrainian refugees? This interview adds perspective on the attitude of Europeans towards the Ukraine crisis, and the subsequent refugee crisis.
Is it possible for you to describe your action (the asylum of seven Ukrainian refugees)?
A friend of a friend of a friend knew I had an empty house and I was willing to receive refugees coming from Ukraine. She got in touch with me, sent me Kateryna’s phone number. I called her, and a few days later, I showed her the house and made plans for cleaning, new furniture, internet connection, and so on…
How did you give shelter to them? Did you cooperate with any institutions?
I did not contact any institution (although I already knew about the platform We Help Ukraine and was considering registering as willing to give help). I am now searching for the proper way to register the aid I’m giving just for security purposes (as I think it is important to know where the refugees are being lodged, who is in charge, what help is being provided, and so on).
What was the origin of your action?
The origins of the action are diverse: I had a free house; a friend (of a friend of a friend) knew a family that had just arrived from Ukraine and needed a place to stay; I consider it a moral obligation to help if one has the chance to do it without any relevant cost associated.
What do you think other people can do for Ukrainians?
I think there is a lot that can be done regarding the thousands of Ukrainians fleeing the war, both as individuals (citizens) and as states. As individuals, we can volunteer for help (with shelter, food, medical supplies and other commodities, help in their integration, with legal assistance or training in education, for instance with the Portuguese, etc.), and as states, we should further sanction Russian interests, help during wartime (mainly with humanitarian help) and in the reconstruction of the country as soon as the war is over (hopefully soon).
Schools should be on the frontline of the full integration of these Ukrainians in our country, and I sincerely hope we will rise to the challenge – students, teachers and the government. In September, we must be ready to welcome all children into our school system, if needed with Ukrainian interpreters, and give them the conditions not to lose yet another indispensable feature of their development. Having, for now, lost the chance to grow in peace where they were born, where their relatives and friends live(d) and where their memories still are, it’s important that they don’t lose the possibility to study, to practice their skills, music, sports, or whatever their interests may be, play, make friends, and so on. of these Ukrainians in our country, and I sincerely hope we will rise to the challenge – students, teachers and the government. In September, we must be ready to welcome all children into our school system, if needed with Ukrainian interpreters, and give them the conditions not to lose yet another indispensable feature of their development. Having, for now, lost the chance to grow in peace where they were born, where their relatives and friends live(d) and where their memories still are, it’s important that they don’t lose the possibility to study, to practice their skills, music, sports, or whatever their interests may be, play, make friends, and so on.
Apart from individual help and the legal framework provided by the government (among other initiatives, we should commend the decision of an expeditious “legalization” of these fellow Europeans), I think that some major companies should also have a role to play. For instance, in order to provide my guests with internet service, I am still subject to a 2 year loyalty period (or an initial fee of 400 euros) and I have not seen any package offered by any telecom company that offers any special conditions to people that must be very dependent on good internet access to keep in touch with those they left behind or to guide and adapt themselves to a new country, a new language, different habits, and so on.
I will add a more personal reflection to what I’ve said, which makes me feel quite uncomfortable: I wonder if there is an element of racism in the abysmal difference between our commitment to the Ukrainian refugees and the previous wave of refugees coming from North Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. And my discomfort rests on the assumption that there is no moral or philosophical background that can justify discrimination on the basis of national borders, the colour of skin, or cultural and religious identity. So the issue isn’t so much that we aren’t doing the right thing–we are!–but rather whether we are consistent and courageous enough to foster an attitude of universal hospitality.
Can you describe the contact that you have with the family?
I’ve been keeping regular contact as we’ve been adapting the house (long closed) to a new large family. I’ve also offered my help with legal issues, job opportunities, and learning Portuguese (they are now having daily classes in a Portuguese school between 6 pm and 10 pm). Although I kept regular contact and visits, I also wanted to give them their space and a sense of autonomy and efficiency (so whatever they could do by themselves, and if they preferred to do it themselves, I chose to “withdraw”).
My main criterion has been: were I in their place (hard to imagine…), what would I prefer? And even though slavs can be very different from Latins, they too love their children, thrive for peace and prosperity, value friendship, honesty and justice, etc. (By the way, I’ve often remembered in these weeks the motto from the sixties “Justice, not charity”, which I think we should all keep in mind in the current scenario).
How do you view your action? What do you think about helping a family going through such a difficult time?
I have no special views on my own actions. I just thought it was the right thing to do. I could easily do it. There is nothing else worth mentioning about it. Those who decided to stay and fight, as well as those who decided to flee and face the dangers of the journey, were brave. My choice was, by comparison, very easy.
My main concern has been to make them feel like guests rather than refugees and to make them feel safe – in a foreign country, with hosts they don’t know (yet!) and a language they can’t speak nor understand (yet!). So far, I think I succeeded in making them feel at ease, and I just hope their welcome is a way to find the peace that, for the time being, they are not able to find at home.
In a resolution on 7 April 2022 about the increasing repression in Russia, including the case of Alexei Navalny, the European Parliament condemned the role of Moscow Patriarch Kirill in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Item 6 of the resolution states:
(See full resolution at the bottom of the article):
“Condemns the role of Moscow Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, in providing theological cover for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; praises the courage of the 300 priests of the Russian Orthodox Church who signed a letter condemning the aggression and expressed their grief over the ordeal of the Ukrainian people, calling for an end to the war.”
In parallel, priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate decided to appeal to the Cathedral of the Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches with a lawsuit against the Russian Patriarch Kirill for “committing moral crimes”. Priests of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine demand an international tribunal for the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill.
The statement of the priests was published by Fr Andrei Pinchuk on his Facebook page.
Excerpt:
“Today, when Patriarch Kirill of Moscow frankly supports Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine, we, the priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, have decided to appeal to the Council of Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches with a lawsuit against Patriarch Kirill.
Our main accusations:
1. Cyril preaches the doctrine of the “Russian world”, which does not correspond to Orthodox teaching and should be condemned as heresy;
2. Kirill committed moral crimes by blessing the war against Ukraine and fully supporting the aggressive actions of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine.
We hope that the Council of Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches will consider our appeal and make its fair decision,”
the appeal says.
See full resolution of the European Parliament below the video.
UATV interviewed on video a priest on the suit against Kirill
UATV, a Russian-language channel of the state foreign broadcasting of Ukraine, addressed to a wide foreign audience and designed “to convey to the whole world objective, relevant and interesting information from Ukraine and about Ukraine the first hand”, launched an interview with a high ranking orthodox priest. The video is presented with the following message:
“Russian World” – an ideology that laid the foundation of Russian hatred of Ukraine. Ukrainian priests of Moscow Patriarchate “filed a suit” to the highest church judicial authority calling to condemn the doctrine spread by the Russian Orthodox Church and its heretical leader – Patriarch Kirill
See the full resolution here:
(if reading the article in our non-English site, find below an automatic translation of the resolution)
Increasing repression in Russia, including the case of Alexey Navalny
European Parliament resolution of 7 April 2022 on the increasing repression in Russia, including the case of Alexei Navalny (2022/2622(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia,
– having regard to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders,
– having regard to the Constitution of the Russian Federation,
– having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell of 28 March 2022 on the Russian independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta,
– having regard to the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 22 March 2022 on the ruling to extend Alexei Navalny’s politically motivated imprisonment by an additional nine years,
– having regard to the statement by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights of 24 March 2022 expressing appreciation for the courageous work of journalists and human rights defenders, including those from the Russian Federation and Belarus,
– having regard to the statement by the Media Freedom Representative of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe of 3 March 2022 on the serious infringement of the right to freedom of expression and media freedom in Russia in the context of the country’s military attack against Ukraine,
– having regard to the statements by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the latest developments in Russia and Ukraine,
– having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the Russian Federation has repeatedly breached international law and its international commitments and has launched an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and perpetrated massacres against its citizens; whereas legislative restrictions, media bans, the criminalisation of independent reporting and free opinion, and other political prosecutions have reached a totalitarian scale in recent months, resulting in the disintegration of independent and pluralistic civil space in Russia;
B. whereas the Russian regime has intensified, in an unprecedented manner, its crackdown on peaceful protesters, independent journalists and bloggers, human rights defenders and civil society activists in an effort to silence any criticism of and opposition to its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine; whereas thousands have fled Russia due to the drastically increased risk of arbitrary arrest and prosecution; whereas this crackdown has had a devastating effect on the lives and freedoms of minorities, LGBTQI+ persons, women, and all people branded by the government and society as deviating from the behavioural or normative rules and expectations imposed or for criticising the regime and the policies of the Russian authorities;
C. whereas fundamental human rights, including freedom of association and freedom of expression, are enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as well as in numerous international legal instruments to which Russia has committed itself; whereas the Russian authorities are responsible for years of systematic propaganda campaigns against Ukraine, Europe and liberal democratic values, culminating in the eradication of any vestiges of a vibrant, politically active and independent civil society;
D. whereas since 24 February 2022, Russian authorities have arbitrarily detained more than 15 400 peaceful anti-war protesters across the country, subjecting some to severe ill‑treatment and other human rights violations; whereas more than 60 criminal cases have already been brought since then;
E. whereas numerous laws imposed over the past few years, such as the ‘foreign agents’ law and its variations, the regulation of and adjudication over so-called ‘extremist organisations’ and countless decrees by the regulator responsible for media oversight (Roskomnadzor) have been used by Russian authorities for their concentrated crackdown on independent civil society and media active in Russia, targeting in particular non-governmental organisations (NGOs), human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, as well as women’s rights, LGBTQI+ and environmental activists, and activists of ethnic and cultural minorities; whereas the imposition of all of this legislation, regulation and judicial and administrative burdens is forcing civil society actors to refuse foreign funding, engage in self-censorship and reduce both their public visibility and their activities for fear of state retaliation;
F. whereas on 4 March 2022, the Russian Parliament amended the Criminal Code to impose a penalty of up to 15 years in prison for spreading allegedly ‘fake’ information about the war in Ukraine; whereas on 22 March 2022, the law was broadened to criminalise the sharing of ‘fake news’ about any activities of Russia’s official bodies abroad; whereas on 4 March 2022, the Russian Duma banned demonstrations against the war in Ukraine; whereas the Russian legal reforms have introduced administrative and criminal offences for Russian nationals and legal entities who call for international sanctions against the Russian state, its nationals or any Russian legal entities;
G. whereas Russian authorities have forced several independent media outlets to suspend their activities, close down, or move their activities abroad, while blocking access to others in the context of growing internet censorship, control and isolation, thereby depriving the Russian population of unbiased information about Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war crimes being committed there in the name of the Russian Federation; whereas these include, most notably, the radio station Echo of Moscow, the TV station Dozhd and the newspaper Novaya Gazeta; whereas the authorities have blocked foreign social media in Russia and blacklisted Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, labelling it as ‘extremist’;
H. whereas since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine, hundreds of journalists, human rights defenders, activists and others have left Russia due to the drastically increased risk of arbitrary arrest and prosecution, including after President Putin referred to those standing up against the war as ‘national traitors’ and a ‘fifth column’;
I. whereas on 16 March 2022, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided to revoke the membership of the Russian Federation in the Council of Europe, effective immediately; whereas the Russian Federation, for its part, decided to leave the Council of Europe on 15 March 2022, depriving Russian citizens of the protection enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and denying them access to judicial remedies before the European Court of Human Rights;
J. whereas Alexei Navalny, a Russian lawyer, opposition politician and anti-corruption activist, and laureate of the 2021 Sakharov Prize, was arrested in January 2021 and has been in prison since February 2021, where he has been serving an arbitrary, politically motivated sentence and has been repeatedly subjected to torture and inhumane treatment; whereas the EU has condemned the poisoning and politically motivated imprisonment of Alexei Navalny in the strongest possible terms, imposed targeted sanctions and continues to demand an independent investigation into his poisoning;
K. whereas on 22 March 2022, Moscow’s Lefortovski Court, following an extraordinary session staged in a prison camp and thus outside regular court facilities, sentenced Alexei Navalny to nine years in a maximum security prison and issued him with an administrative fine of RUB 1,2 million (approximately EUR 12 838); whereas this judgment clearly contravenes international law and the Russian Constitution and is as unlawful, arbitrary and politically motivated as the previous judgment;
L. whereas a number of activists have been threatened with or subjected to arrest and prosecution for supporting or working with Alexei Navalny or for supporting his ideas, like the smart voting strategy; whereas they were accused and prosecuted for such support based on the retroactive application of new laws or administrative decisions on the basis of their social media statements, and many of them have left Russia after facing criminal charges; whereas Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation was labelled ‘extremist’;
1. Condemns the Russian regime’s domestic repression, which has worsened in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; demands that Russian authorities stop the harassment, intimidation and attacks against all anti-war protesters, independent civil society organisations, NGOs, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, as well as women’s rights, LGBTQI+ and environmental activists in Russia; expresses its solidarity with the democratic forces in Russia committed to an open and free society, and underlines its support for all individuals and organisations which have been the target of attacks and repression;
2. Condemns the neo-totalitarian, imperialist ideological stance cultivated by the Russian Government and its propagandists; emphasises that the assault against democracy and disregard for the rights of other nations has paved Russia’s path towards despotism, international aggression and war crimes; underscores that an undemocratic Russia is a constant threat to Europe’s security and stability;
3. Deplores Russian legislation, including on ‘foreign agents’, the changes to the Criminal Code introduced on 4 March and 22 March 2022, and the Mass Media Law, which are used to engage in judicial harassment against dissenting voices in the country and abroad and to undermine independent media; underscores that these developments are in blatant contradiction with the commitments Russia has voluntarily undertaken under international law and written into its own Constitution;
4. Denounces the continuous and increasing censorship by Russian authorities, including of the internet, and urges them to immediately put an end to their control and censorship;
5. Condemns Russian authorities’ behaviour in persecuting the mothers of Russian soldiers and their established organisations, depriving Russian parents of information on the whereabouts of their children and refusing to cooperate with Ukrainian authorities in order to return the remains of Russian soldiers killed in action;
6. Condemns the role of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for providing theological cover for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; praises the courage of the 300 priests of the Russian Orthodox Church who have signed a letter condemning the aggression, grieving over the ordeal of the Ukrainian people and asking to “stop the war”;
7. Strongly condemns the imprisonment of the Sakharov Prize laureate Alexei Navalny and reiterates its call for his immediate and unconditional release, as well as of the hundreds of other Russian citizens baselessly detained merely for having the courage to demonstrate in favour of democracy and peace or to improve their rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; calls on the Russian authorities to improve conditions in prisons and detention facilities in order to meet international standards; considers Alexei Navalny’s humanitarian, health and safety situation a priority concern for the EU; calls on the Russian authorities to take all necessary measures to fully secure his rights during his unlawful detention; condemns the fact that the trial against Alexei Navalny did not respect his right to a fair trial and reiterates its call for a transparent investigation into the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, without delay;
8. Considers the repression against Alexei Navalny, his supporters, the media and civil society, all intended as part of a prelude to Russia’s criminal war of aggression, and reiterates that political pluralism and free media are the best safeguards against and obstacles to international aggression by an undemocratic government; considers that our efforts to support freedom of opinion and the media for Russian citizens are an intrinsic part of our efforts to combat the war and aggression in Ukraine;
9. Forcefully condemns the decisions by Russian courts leading to the closure of International Memorial and the Memorial Human Rights Centre, together one of Russia’s oldest and most prominent human rights organisations and a Sakharov Prize laureate; condemns the continued warnings by Roskomnadzor against Novaya Gazeta concerning censorship and alleged violations of the ‘foreign agents’ law, resulting in the newspaper’s announcement to cease operations until the end of the war in Ukraine; equally deplores the Russian Prosecutor-General’s request for Roskomnadzor to restrict access to Echo of Moscow and Dozhd due to their coverage of the war in Ukraine; commends the role played by these outlets, as well as so many other independent organisations and news outlets that have since been closed down, in uncovering the truth and providing facts about the crimes of the Soviet regime and the Russian Government, as well as their commitment to human rights; calls for an end to the systematic repression of journalistic institutions and independent media, which constitute the fundamental pillars of freedom and democracy;
10. Calls on the UN Human Rights Council to investigate in full and as a matter of urgency the abuses of the right to information and freedom of expression perpetrated by the Russian regime;
11. Expresses deep concern over how the crackdown on Russian civil society, human rights defenders, women’s rights activists, sexual and reproductive health and rights activists and LGBTQI+ communities is further exacerbating the situation of already vulnerable and targeted groups in the country;
12. Reiterates that the free and independent work of civil society organisations and the media is a cornerstone of a democratic society; calls on Russia, therefore, to establish a clear legal framework as well as a safe environment for civil society organisations, protesters, media and political actors in line with Russia’s Constitution and international obligations and with international human rights standards, enabling them to carry out their legitimate and useful work without interference; stresses the need to guarantee efficient legal recourse for protesters, civil society activists and journalists whose fundamental rights have been violated;
13. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States to closely monitor the human rights situation in Russia, to provide emergency assistance and to increase support for the civil society, independent NGOs, human rights defenders and independent media which remain active in Russia, including sustainable and flexible financial assistance; calls on the EU Delegation and the Member States’ representations in Russia to publicly show solidarity with those persecuted;
14. Urges the Commission and the Member States to strengthen protection for the rights and physical integrity of activists, independent journalists and human rights defenders targeted by the Russian authorities’ repression, and to provide them with emergency visas to enable them to leave the country and find temporary shelter in the EU, as well as to allow threatened or banned Russian NGOs and media to immediately continue their work from EU territory if needed;
15. Calls on the VP/HR and the Council to make effective use of the EU’s global human rights sanctions mechanism and impose restrictive measures on all Russian officials involved in the crackdown against independent civil society and media and peaceful protesters, as well as in this latest case against Alexei Navalny;
16. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to prevent and counter the spread of disinformation, including propaganda, and strengthen independent media; welcomes, therefore, the development of specific platforms and news in Russian and Ukrainian; calls for EU strategic communications to be improved and for an exploration of effective ways to counter war propaganda originating in Russia from outlets such as Rossija, Channel One Russia and NTV, which disseminate content approving of the war of aggression and misinforming people about it; calls on the Member States, the Commission and the EEAS to continue to enhance alternative online Russian-language information on the unfolding developments to counter disinformation, to continue to ensure that public statements from the EU and the Member States are translated into Russian and to address Russian-speaking audiences and platforms;
17. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to host banned media teams in the EU and to develop a joint platform for media in exile, as well as to support technologies that enable people to use the internet to exercise their fundamental rights, in particular the freedom of information and expression, and to support the pursuit of democracy and the rule of law, by establishing technological means to circumvent communication surveillance and the blocking of websites and applications in Russia, including low-tech via M-waves, a VPN Russia platform, anonymisation networks and satellite TV;
18. Calls on the EU Delegation and national diplomatic representations in Russia to closely monitor the situation on the ground and how trials are handled and to offer those concerned any support that they may need, including direct financial assistance to pay for lawyers and experts; calls on all governments to refuse any future extradition requests for Russian nationals for offences under the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences;
19. Urges the Member States, the Council and the Commission to secure humanitarian status and create safe migration possibilities for threatened Russian opposition, civil society and media representatives, including securing opportunities for them to enjoy long-term residence and work in the European Union; calls on the Member States to devise a mechanism to protect Russian soldiers who decide to defect; calls on financial institutions, banks, credit card companies and government authorities to introduce screening procedures for the tailored application of sanctions against Russian citizens in the EU in order to allow opposition activists, independent civil society and media representatives to retain access to their financial assets necessary to secure their existence in the European Union;
20. Recalls that academic and cultural collaboration at an individual level, even in times of conflict, may help to strengthen pluralistic voices in anti-democratic circumstances and serve as a basis for facilitating the re-establishment of relationships after the conflict; underlines that the Russian scientific community has been a primary target of repression by Putin’s regime;
21. Stresses the strategic value of the input of Russian academics who oppose the war in order to better analyse Putin’s regime and how to counter it; calls for an EU strategy to allow Russian students and professors to officially continue their studies and work in European universities, particularly in humanitarian disciplines, and to receive their corresponding diplomas;
22. Asks the EEAS, the Commission and the Member States to mainstream human rights and civil society consultation across all dialogues between the EU, its Member States and Russia, and to abide by their commitment to gender mainstreaming;
23. Calls for the EU and the Member States to continue to engage with the people of Russia and with Russian civil society in exile; urges the EU to demonstrate its readiness to support Russian civil society in its efforts to build a democratic Russia, and to welcome a democratic and responsible Russia back into the international community;
24. Calls for the EU to appoint a special envoy for a democratic Russia, who should be responsible for relations with the Russian people, in particular with democracy defenders in exile and those who have remained in Russia and want the country to return to the path of democracy;
25. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the EEAS, to help establish and support a Democratic Russia Hub for continuous dialogue with the democratic Russian community, in particular the anti-war committee established by Russian democratic opposition activists, in order to provide direct communication with the Russian people, to develop together with civil society an EU strategy for a future democratic Russia, to improve the integration of new emigrants from Russia through educational programmes, and to organise annual EU summits with democratic Russia in exile;
27. Notes that according to the Levada Center, 83 % of Russians support Putin’s war in Ukraine, while the percentage of Russians who say the country is moving in the right direction has risen from 52 % to 69 %, the highest level ever recorded since 1996; applauds, in this regard, those brave individuals who openly protest and oppose Russian imperialism in its newest form – the invasion of Ukraine – despite the brutality of the rioting policy, as well as media and social pressure; urges EU citizens, nevertheless, not to equate all Russian citizens with the brutal actions of their leadership and military in Ukraine; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support and protect the critical voices within the Russian diaspora who are facing threats from Russian authorities; condemns rallies organised by Russian diasporas in support of the war or in protest against the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees;
28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.
Nazism in Ukraine – Sociologist Massimo Introvigne has just published, in his already popular online magazine BitterWinter.ORG, a series of articles with in-depth research to separate facts from fiction, about the propaganda that is trying to portray Ukraine as Nazified country.
See the excellent series of 7 articles published by Massimo Introvigne: Nazism in Ukraine – Separating Facts from Fiction.
A main argument of Russian propaganda in the current Ukrainian war is that Ukraine is under the decisive influence of “Nazis” and needs to be “denazified.” The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is Jewish, which makes any claims that he heads a “Nazi government” paradoxical. However, the Russians insist that Nazis are a significant part of those fighting against pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass, and that Ukraine keeps lionizing those who collaborated with the Nazis during World War II. The Ukrainians counter that there are quite a few Nazis fighting “for” the pro-Russian Donbass separatists rather than against them. Read the full article by clicking on the title above.
The main argument used by Russians to prove that present-day Ukrainians have Nazi sympathies are the honors officially tributed to nationalist leader Stepan Bandera (1909–1959). Putin’s Russia has inherited from the Soviets the use of “Banderist” as synonym for “Ukrainian Nazi.” The story, however, is somewhat more complicated. Read the full article by clicking on the title above.
Ukraine became independent in 1991. By then, there were few who had been involved in significant ways in the Nazi German occupation of Ukraine who were still alive. Many had been executed in Soviet times; others had escaped abroad or died of old age. However, small neo-Nazi groups emerged, as they did in most European countries, among young people who had never encountered German Nazism. Read the full article by clicking on the title above.
There is a propaganda war around neo-Nazism in Ukraine, and it is a war where intelligence services play their usual roles. Not many outside Ukraine are familiar with the story of Eduard Kovalenko, but it is a perfect illustration of how Russian disinformation works on this issue. Read the full article by clicking on the title above
Those who have heard of Nazis in Ukraine have certainly heard of the Azov Battalion, which is presented often by Russian and pro-Russian propaganda as the smoking gun proving that the Ukrainian government promotes Nazism. Read the full article by clicking on the title above
Putin has repeatedly indicated that “denazification” of Ukraine is one of the aims of its war. One can ask, however, whether, before denazifying other countries, he should not put his own house in order. Neo-Nazism is not a peculiar Ukrainian phenomenon. It exists in all European countries, and Russia is no exception. Read the full article by clicking on the title above
It is now time to draw some conclusions from the six articles I have devoted to the question of Nazism in Ukraine. They show, I believe, that Russian propaganda is just propaganda, and war propaganda is rarely informative. Read the full article by clicking on the title above
Anti-Cults – Since the Maidan events in 2014, when then President Yakunovich was forced to resign after huge protests in the streets of Ukraine, the pan-European Anti-cult movement, led by the European Federation of Centers of Research and Information on Sectarianism (FECRIS), has been participating in the Russian propaganda machine that finally led to the current war.
In 2013, after Ukraine had been on a pro-European trajectory some years and was about to sign an association agreement with the EU which would have more closely integrated political and economic ties between the EU and Ukraine, Putin’s forces pressurised Yakunovich to scuttle the agreement. Yakunovich, who was known as a pro-Russian corrupted leader, caved in and that started what has been called the Maidan revolution in Ukraine.
Counting on religious forces against the West
The Maidan revolution represented a major threat in the mind of Putin, who then started a propaganda machine to discredit the new authorities. Since then, the Russian rhetoric against Ukraine’s new democratic forces in power, which were definitely not pro-Russian, included accusations of being neo-Nazis, but also to be puppets of Western democracies hiding an anti-Russian agenda. For his propaganda, he counted largely on his “religious forces”, mainly the Russian Orthodox Church, which still had quite an important influence in Ukraine.
The Russian Orthodox Church’s main leaders, such as Patriarch Kirill, have always backed Putin’s efforts to get the rid of pro-European forces in Ukraine, accusing them of persecuting Ukrainian Orthodox members affiliated to the Moscow Patriarchate (which might have been true to some extent, as the opposite was true in Russian controlled-occupied territories in Ukraine), but also to threaten the “Old-Rus’” unity[1], and are still doing so as we could see recently when Patriarch Kirill accused those who oppose Putin’s war in Ukraine to be the “forces of evil”.
Alexander Dvorkin, the “sectologist”
Patriarch Kirill and Vladimir Putin could also count on the “anti-cult” movement, which in Russia was led by Vice-President of FECRIS Alexander Dvorkin, a Russian-Orthodox theologian who was often presented as an expert in “sectology” by Russian authorities. FECRIS is a French anti-cult organization with pan-European influence. The French government provides the majority of FECRIS’ funding, and in fact it was founded by a French anticult association called UNADFI (National Union of Associations for the Defense of Families and Individuals against cults) in 1994.
At the very beginning of the new Ukrainian government that had been elected after Yakunovich’s resignation, on April 30, 2014 Alexander Dvorkin was interviewed by radio Voice of Russia, the main Russian Governmental Radio (that a few months later changed its name to Radio Sputnik). Dvorkin, introduced as an “anti-cult activist and Vice-President of the European Federation of Centers of Research and Information on Sectarianism, which is the umbrella organization for anti-cult groups in Europe”, was asked to comment on the “hidden religious agenda behind Maidan and the Ukrainian crisis”. He then forwarded the Russian State propaganda in a very interesting way[2].
Greek Catholics, Baptists and other so-called “Cults” targeted
In that interview, Dvorkin first accused the Uniate Church, also known as Greek Catholics, to be behind the revolution: “There are several religious groups and several religious cults which play quite a prominent role in those events. First of all, the Uniate church…played a very prominent and a very, I’d say, violent role for lots of Uniate priests who preached there in all their liturgical vestments…” When the interviewer asked Dvorkin what the Vatican could do, as it had called for “the necessity of returning to peace developments in Ukraine”, Dvorkin’s answer was to explain it could do nothing, because the Vatican was now led by Jesuits, which had become very much pro-Marxist and in favor of revolution through the centuries, adding: “Well, the present Pope Francis, he is not really pro-revolutionary, but the way he behaves shows that he accepted part of this legacy”.
Alexander Dvorkin with Bulgarian Orthodox Church Clergy discussing about Ukraine on July 17, 2019
Then Dvorkin goes after the Baptists, accusing them of playing an important part in the Maidan and to be very nationalistic in Ukraine. He further goes into accusing then Prime Minister Yatsenyuk to be a “hidden Scientologist”, while pretending to be Uniate: “There were a lot of media reports which called him Scientologist… If he would have been an open Scientologist, it would have been very bad. But still, at least you would know what to expect from him. But when a person, actually Yatsenyuk, called himself a Greek Catholic Uniate [while being a Scientologist], and there was a Uniate priest that confirmed that he was Uniate, I believe this is very dangerous.” Then in an interesting conspiracy theory manner, he extrapolated on the fact that this was a way for CIA to control him, using Scientology techniques in order to “control his behavior and control his actions”.
Last but not least, Dvorkin led an attack on what he calls “neo-paganism”, which he accused of being tied into neo-Nazis, a rhetoric that has taken a very important significance in current Russian propaganda, as we can see with the “Denazification” advocated today by Putin to justify the war in Ukraine.
Gerry Amstrong’s love letters to Putin
Dvorkin is of course not the only member of FECRIS to have participated to the Russian anti-West propaganda. Amongst others, a Canadian supporter/member of FECRIS, Gerry Amstrong, wrote two letters to Putin which have been published, one on the Russian Orthodox Church website “proslavie.ru”[3] and the other on the FECRIS Russian affiliate’s website[4]. Amstrong is a former Canadian Scientologist who became an apostate of the Church of Scientology, and who flew to Canada to avoid a warrant arrest after he was convicted by an American court for some of his anti-Scientology activities. In the first letter, published on 2 December 2014, he says that after visiting Russia, “at the invitation of people in the Russian Orthodox Church…I became pro-Russian.” He adds: “I did not become anti-West or anti-US, although I am dead set against the West and the US’s superpower hypocrisy.” Then he praises Putin for having offered asylum to Edward Snowden, and being “highly intelligent, reasonable and presidential.” After complaining about his conviction in the US, he thanks Putin “for whatever officials in your government have done to facilitate my being in Russia and being able to communicate to your citizens” as well as for standing against a European Court of Human Rights decision which had condemned Russia for violating the rights of Scientologists. He then blames the West for its “black propaganda” against the President of Russia.
While this letter does not explicitly mention Ukraine it is written on the eve of the new Ukrainian democratic era and is aligned with the rhetoric of Russia being threatened by Western ideologies and cults, and being the last rampart for maintaining “a moral position” against such.
Gerry Armstrong, Alexander Dvorkin, Thomas Gandow and Luigi Corvaglia at a FECRIS conference in Salekhard, Siberia, on September 29, 2017. In the center, Archbishop Nikolai Chashin.
In his second letter to Vladimir Putin, published on 26 June 2018 on the Russian FECRIS website, Amstrong, introduced on the website as a “Christian activist” and good friend of Mr Dvorkin – who is said to have taken care of the translation of the letter in Russian – starts by congratulating Putin for his re-election. Then, he goes on to congratulate Putin for his actions in occupied Crimea: “Congratulations on the opening of the Crimean bridge for vehicular traffic. I congratulate the whole country on such an amazing achievement. This is a blessing both for Crimea and for the rest of Russia.” He then takes the defense of Putin against the campaign by “the West” writing that it is “dangerous, cruel, hypocritical, unreasonable and based on obvious ideological motives”
The letter goes on: “You know that there are people in Canada and other Western countries who do not believe the smear campaign against you, realize it is wrong, see it as a threat, and even admit that it can be used as a pretext or trigger for nuclear war. On the other hand, it’s easy to see that there are plenty of people out there who want this threat and other similar threats to succeed and grow, and to do so, they plot, act, pay, and get paid to make this threat effective. These are the same people who are running a campaign here to defame you.” Again, this is a conspiracy rhetoric that is of great significance, because it puts the blame of war on the West and its so-called “smear campaign”, that would be the underlying cause of Putin’s obligation to start a war in Ukraine.
USCIRF report on the anti-cult movement in Russia
In 2020, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) published a report called “The Anti-cult Movement and Religious Regulation in Russia and the Former Soviet Union”[5]. The reports explains that “While both the Soviet legacy and the ROC [Russian Orthodox Church] are major influences, current attitudes about and approaches to religious minorities also stem from other factors, including post-Soviet socio-economic developments, the Putin regime’s desire for national unity, individual fears about family security or change generally, and transnational concerns about the perceived dangers from new religious movements (NRMs)”. Ironically enough, it goes to the roots of the anti-cult movement which definitely originate in the West.
The report explains that after 2009, “the rhetoric of the anti-cult movement and the Russian state have converged noticeably over the subsequent decade. Echoing Putin’s concerns about spiritual and moral security, Dvorkin claimed in 2007 that NRMs deliberately ‘inflict damage on Russian patriotic feelings’.” And that’s how the convergence began, and why the Russian Orthodox Church and the Anti-cult movement became key in Putin’s propaganda agenda.
Speaking of Dvorkin the report says: “Dvorkin’s influence has also extended outside of the post-Soviet orbit. In 2009, the same year in which he was appointed head of Russia’s Council of Experts, he also became Vice-President of the European Federation of Research and Information Centers on Sectarianism (FECRIS), a French anti-cult organization with panEuropean influence. The French government provides the majority of FECRIS’ funding and the group regularly spreads negative propaganda about religious minorities, including at international forums like the OSCE Human Dimensions conference. Dvorkin’s center is the primary associate of FECRIS in Russia and receives significant financial support from both the ROC and the Russian government.”
Then in a chapter called “exporting intolerance in Ukraine”, USCIRF goes on: “Russia brought along its restrictive religious regulation framework when it invaded Crimea in 2014, including the symbiosis between anti-cult ideas and national security. The occupation regime in Ukraine frequently has used religious regulations to terrorize the general population as well as to target activists in the Crimean Tatar community.” In its conclusion the USCIRF report makes clear that “Alexander Dvorkin and his associates have carved out influential roles in government and society, shaping the public discourse on religion across numerous countries.”
Donetsk and Luhansk’s fight against so-called cults
Interestingly enough, Donbass pseudo-states Donetsk and Luhansk, have been the only places in the world that makes fighting “cults” a constitutional principle. Bitter-Winter magazine on religious liberty concluded from that and other evidence of their brutal denial of religious liberty, that “what is happening in the pseudo-‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ is a clear representation of the dystopic Orthodox theocracy Putin’s ideologists have in mind for a ‘Russian World’ whose borders they continuously expand.”[6]
It’s also not the first time that the Anti-cult movement in general, and FECRIS in particular, is linked to nationalistic and pro-war propaganda across Europe. In a report published in July 2005 and signed by a French attorney and Miroslav Jankovic, who later became the OSCE National Legal Officer in Serbia, it was pointed out that the FECRIS representative in Serbia was Colonel Bratislav Petrovic[7].
FECRIS’ past in Serbia
Colonel Bratislava Petrovic
According to the report, Colonel Bratislav Petrovic of the Yugoslav Army was also a neuropsychiatrist. During the Milosevic regime, he headed the Institute for Mental Health and Military Psychology of the Military Academy in Belgrade. From that position, he specialized in the selection and psychological preparation of the soldiers of Milosevic’s army before they were sent to war. Colonel Petrovic was also instrumental in forwarding Milosevic’s propaganda that the Serbs were the victims and not the perpetrators of genocide in Bosnia, contrary to all reliable UN reports on the subject.
The report goes further: “Petrovic is now applying his psychological techniques of indoctrination to target religious minorities. Yet this is not new. In 1993, while ethnic and religious cleansing was underway in Croatia and Bosnia, Petrovic used that same ideology to condemn religious minorities within Serbia, accusing them of being terrorist organizations and conveniently labelling them ‘sects.’”
The report goes on by listing all the so-called cults that were targeted by FECRIS in Serbia: the Baptists, the Nazareens, the Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Mormons, the Pentecostals, Theosophy, Anthroposophy, Alchemy, Kabala, the Yoga centres, Transcendental Meditation, Karma Center, Shri Chimnoy, Sai Baba, Hare Krishna, Falun Gong, the Rosicrucian Order, the Masons, etc. As you can see, Petrovic was far from falling short of cults to fight against. These were similar to those that have been targeted by Dvorkin and ROC propaganda in Russia in their attempt to justify the protection of “Russian patriotic feelings” and “spiritual security”.
FECRIS backed up by Orthodox leaders and churches in other places
This initiative from FECRIS was backed by the Serbian Orthodox Church, which, through the words of his representative Bishop Porfirije, laid out the need to have “authentic data in exposing sects one by one as groups which are spreading spiritual terror and violence”. Porfirije also stated that the “Fight against this evil will be easier when the Law on religious organizations comes”, referring to a bill that he and Petrovic had tried to get amended. The amendment they filed (but which was rejected) aimed to reduce the rights of minority faiths in Serbia. Again, this is very similar to what happened in Russia, excepting that in Russia the law restricting the rights of religious minorities that had been lobbied for by FECRIS was passed and used extensively against non-violent religious groups.
Interestingly enough, the FECRIS representative in Belarus has a link on the FECRIS website that links directly to the website of the Belarusian Orthodox Church, which is nothing less than a Branch of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Bulgarian Representative of FECRIS, the “Center for Research on New Religious Movements”, publishes on its website calls from the Bulgarian Orthodox Church not to tolerate “non-canonical gatherings”.
Nevertheless, as stated by USCIRF 2020 report: “Dvorkin and his associates do not exercise a monopoly on Orthodox thought and opinion, and dissenting voices within the church [ROC] have criticized the anti-cult movement for relying on discredited theories and non-canonical sources”. Such “dissenting voices” have not been heard amongst FECRIS.
[1] The Rus’ were an early medieval group, who lived in modern Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other countries, and are the ancestors of modern Russians and other Eastern European ethnicities.
[2] Interview of Alexander Dvorkin on Voice of Russia, 30 April 2014 in the talk show “Burning point”.
[7] Report on “The Repression of Religious Minorities in Serbia: The role played by the European Federation of Centres of Research and Information on Sectarianism (FECRIS)” – 27 July 2005 by Patricia Duval and Miroslav Jankovic.
How is the war being felt inside the Russian Federation? Read here the impact of the invasion in Russia.
The source for this article chose to maintain anonymity.
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its 6th day, the situation in Russia gets worse and worse. Not only for the opposition but for all Russians. There are “many” people against the war, but most are afraid to speak out, mainly because most people are public servants or work for oligarch-owned companies, and so don’t want to lose their jobs.
“The people who are against the war want to protest but are too afraid to lose their jobs, get jailed, pay fines or just get hardly beaten by the police…”
The number of people arrested in protests against the war and Putin’s regime are already in the thousands, most sources say.
“The Russian opposition is disorganized, as many left the country or were jailed after Alexander Navalny’s return last year.” – “(…) the Russians aren’t really used to self-organization, especially in protest activity.”
As the western sanctions get tougher and tougher, the economic situation in Russia is starting to get desperate.
“Right now many people are storming shops to buy cars, electronics, and other items before the sanctions go into effect.” – Many international corporations have already said that they will stop imports to Russia.
“My friend told me that many people rushed to buy dollars and euros, as the rouble has become insanely volatile, but the Russian banks are having problems providing for the population.”
According to the source, Russians are having issues entering social media sites like Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. “The Russian state announced that it will slow social media sites on Russian territory as the companies declined to stop calling Russian media outlets reports as “fake news”.
