“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.” So famously wrote Charles Dickens in “A Tale of Two Cities,” and his words apply to our present situation as well.
It is the worst of times when the ghosts of aggression and war rear their ugly heads again. It is the age of foolishness when many believe propaganda aimed at blaming the victim rather than the aggressor. It is the epoch of incredulity when we lose faith that good can ultimately prevail. It is a season of darkness when cities are bombed and children are killed in an unprovoked war. It is a winter of despair when millions of refugees leave everything and come to European Union countries in tears.
But at the same time, it is the best of times when Europe and the world wake up and discover how precious is the fragile achievement of democracy. It is an age of wisdom when in Europe we all understand we have tolerated human rights violations for too long. It is an epoch of belief when we cherish the hope that we will overcome war and tyrants as we were able to overcome a pandemic. A season of light and a spring of hope will dispel darkness and despair if we, the Europeans, understand that it is our values that will carry the day in the end, and not in Europe only.
Taiwan is also at the center of global concerns, and they affect Europe as we saw when we all had to stand in solidarity with Lithuania after it was sanctioned for its friendship with the Taiwanese. Defending Taiwan is not about economic ties, as important as they may be, it is about values. Either Europe is a community founded on a shared heritage of defending democracy and human rights or there is no Europe.
SOME PROBLEMS OF TAIWAN’S DEMOCRACY
While we defend the right of the Taiwanese to freely choose their government and their model of international relations, as European friends we should also look at what in Taiwan’s democracy is still open to a dangerous criticism by its enemies. As the Bible says in the Book of Proverbs, “A truly good friend will openly correct you.”
As the current President of Taiwan has acknowledged, two main problems there are corruption and transitional justice. Although anti-corruption plans have been implemented, Taiwan still ranks comparatively high in global statistics about corruption. Among the most corrupt sectors of Taiwan’s bureaucracy is the National Taxation Bureau (NTB). One of the reasons is that tax bureaucrats receive high bonuses when they enforce tax bills against taxpayers. This creates a powerful incentive to issue high tax bills and quickly enforce them and pocket the bonuses, whether they are right or wrong.
Corruption is a typical problem of societies that transition from authoritarian to post-authoritarian political systems. Old habits die hard, and bureaucrats who were accustomed to be almost omnipotent are not happy to relinquish their power.
This is the problem of “transitional justice.” A true transitional justice implies that when an authoritarian regime is replaced by a democratic one, past violations of human rights are publicly acknowledged, perpetrators are brought to justice, laws are reformed, and victims are indemnified.
The experience of many European countries proves that the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime does not happen overnight. In Taiwan, Martial Law was abolished on July 15, 1987. But this did not mean that the next day Taiwan became a full-blown democracy. The party that was in power in 1987 remained in power and controlled the presidency or the Parliament until the first party rotation in 2000. This obviously made transitional justice difficult.
THE TAI JI MEN CASE
Those who have visited Taiwan recently may have noticed massive protests in the streets of Taipei, where thousands call for tax reform and transitional justice in a case concerning a spiritual movement, Tai Ji Men, a “menpai” (similar to a school) of qigong, martial arts, and self-cultivation rooted in esoteric Taoism but open to disciples (dizi) of all faiths, whose Grand Master (Shifu) is Dr. Hong Tao-Tze.
Dr. Hong also promotes high profile initiatives for a culture of conscience and world peace, and brought traditional Tai Ji Men culture abroad through over three thousand cultural events and martial arts performances, many of which were held in Europe. Tai Ji Men’s efforts have been highly praised by international political and spiritual authorities, including different Presidents of Taiwan.
Notwithstanding this praise, Tai Ji Men has been a victim of a campaign of repression that targeted in 1996 several spiritual movements in Taiwan, accused during the post-authoritarian phase of the island’s history of not supporting the candidate who won in that year the first Taiwanese presidential elections. Notwithstanding its caution in not taking political sides, Tai Ji Men was also involved in the crackdown, and Dr Hong was arrested together with his wife and two dizi.
Dr. Hong was falsely, and ridiculously, accused by a prosecutor, who violated the law and abused his authority, of “religious fraud” and even of “raising goblins,” a practice totally foreign to Tai Ji Men. To this, an accusation of tax evasion was added, with fabricated arguments.
On July 13, 2007, the criminal division of the Supreme Court of Taiwan pronounced the final acquittal of Tai Ji Men defendants, declaring them innocent of all charges, including tax evasion. National compensation for the wrongful detention was given to Dr. Hong and his co-defendants who had been detained.
This should have been the end of the Tai Ji Men case. However, some NTB bureaucrats decided to ignore the court decision and go on with their unjustified tax evasion action. They also knew that they could pocket significant bonuses by issuing tax bills against a large movement such as Tai Ji Men.
Even after the Supreme Court had concluded that Dr. Hong had committed no crimes, and there was no tax evasion, they tried to maintain their tax bills for the years 1991 to 1996, claiming that the money Dr. Hong had received from dizi in the so-called “red envelopes” should not be considered as non-taxable gifts but as taxable tuition fees—even if the highest courts in Taiwan had declared they were not tuition fees.
In 2019, the NTB, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Taipei High Administrative Court, agreed that tax bills for the years 1991 and 1993 to 1996 should be corrected to zero, but maintained the tax bill for 1992, including penalties. Logically, this did not make sense, as the content of the red envelopes in 1992 was not different from the other years.
The NTB relied on a technicality, i.e., that for the year 1992, and only for that year, a decision by the Supreme Administrative Court rendered in 2006 had become final. It is a general principle of law that even final decisions can and should be revised or not enforced when a new fact intervenes, in this case the verdict of the criminal section of the Supreme Court of 2007 that found Dr. Hong and Tai Ji Men not guilty of tax evasion. Nonetheless, the NTB refused to cancel the tax bill for 1992.
On May 5 and July 23, 2020, the Taipei High Administrative Court wrote twice to the NTB for the Central Area, asking them to treat 1992 as the other years were treated. This, also, was to no avail. In August 2020, land belonging to Dr. Hong that had been seized was auctioned by the National Enforcement Agency, then confiscated after two auctions were not successful. This property was important for Tai Ji Men, which planned to build a center for self-cultivation on what they consider a sacred land. Massive protests and an international campaign supporting Tai Ji Men followed.
The Tai Ji Men case is not about money. Tai Ji Men spent in legal fees only more than it should have paid had it settled with the NTB. It did not settle for a reason of conscience and values. While protests are gaining international momentum, it is time for the European friends of Taiwan to tell the Taiwanese authorities that we admire and support Taiwan but we expect it to solve its human rights, transitional justice, and freedom of religion or belief problems. The Tai Ji Men case would be a good starting point. The time is now, “the worst of times” and “the best of times.”. ■
It is time for the European friends of Taiwan to tell the Taiwanese authorities that we admire and support Taiwan but we expect it to solve its human rights, transitional justice, and freedom of religion or belief problems. The Tai Ji Men case would be a good starting point. The time is now, “the worst of times” and “the best of times”.
Washington, D.C. – The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) today released its 2022 Annual Report documenting developments during 2021, including significant regress in countries such as Afghanistan and the Central African Republic (CAR). USCIRF’s 2022 Annual Report provides recommendations to enhance the U.S. government’s promotion of freedom of religion or belief abroad.
Cover-2022-USCIRF-Annual-Report
The report covers discrimination and oppression against members of the following faiths: Baha’i, Buddhist Hoa Hao, Buddhist Tibetan, Catholics, Jehovah’s Witness, Orthodox, Protestants, Erfan-e Halgheh Practitioner, Falun Gong, Hindu, Humanist, Jewish, Muslim Ahmadiyya, Muslim Shi’a, Muslim Sufi, Muslim Sunni, Church of Scientology, and others.
The report also notes USCIRF recommendations implemented by the U.S. government—including the designation of Russia as a country of particular concern, the imposition of targeted sanctions on religious freedom violators, and genocide determinations for atrocities perpetrated by the Chinese government against Uyghur and other Turkic Muslims and by the Burmese military against Rohingya Muslims.
“We are disheartened by the deterioration of freedom of religion or belief in some countries— especially Afghanistan under the Taliban’s de facto government since August. Religious minorities have faced harassment, detention, and even death due to their faith or beliefs, and years of progress toward more equitable access to education and representation of women and girls have disappeared,” USCIRF Chair Nadine Maenza said.
“Meanwhile, USCIRF is encouraged by the Biden administration’s continued prioritization of international religious freedom during its first year. To continue this progress, we strongly urge the administration to implement USCIRF’s recommendations—in particular, to expand its Priority 2 refugee designation to grant access for at-risk religious groups in Afghanistan, and to designate Nigeria as a country of particular concern.”
USCIRF’s independence and bipartisanship enables it to unflinchingly identify threats to religious freedom abroad. In its 2022 Annual Report, USCIRF recommends 15 countries to the State Department for designation as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) because their governments engage in or tolerate “systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations.” These include 10 that the State Department designated as CPCs in November 2021: Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—as well as five others: Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, Syria, and Vietnam.
For the first time ever, the State Department designated Russia as a CPC in 2021, which USCIRF had been recommending since 2017. Regrettably, the State Department removed Nigeria as a CPC though it had been added the previous year and religious freedom conditions remain dire.
The 2022 Annual Report also recommends 12 countries for placement on the State Department’s Special Watch List (SWL) based on their governments’ perpetration or toleration of severe violations. These include three that the State Department placed on that list in November 2021: Algeria, Cuba, and Nicaragua—as well as nine others: Azerbaijan, CAR, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. In 2021, USCIRF removed CAR from its SWL recommendations because incidents of religious targeting and violence had decreased during 2020, but these trends have since been reversed.
The 2022 Annual Report further recommends to the State Department seven non-state actors for redesignation as “entities of particular concern” (EPCs) for systematic, ongoing, egregious violations. The State Department designated all seven of these groups as EPCs in November 2021: al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Houthis, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP or ISIS-West Africa), and Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).
“Throughout the past year, the U.S. government continued to condemn abuses of religious freedom and hold perpetrators accountable through targeted sanctions and other tools at its disposal. Moving forward, the United States should take additional steps to support freedom of religion or belief around the world. USCIRF’s 2022 Annual Report makes recommendations on how Congress and the Executive Branch can further advance this universal, fundamental human right,” USCIRF Vice Chair Nury Turkel stated.
In addition to chapters with key findings and U.S. policy recommendations for these 27 countries, the annual report describes and assesses U.S. international religious freedom policy overall. The report also highlights important global developments and trends related to religious freedom during 2021—including in countries that do not meet the criteria for CPC or SWL recommendations. These include: the COVID-19 pandemic and religious freedom, blasphemy and hate speech law enforcement, transnational repression, religious intolerance in Europe, deteriorating religious freedom conditions in South Asia, and political upheaval that raises religious freedom concerns.
The report also includes sections highlighting key USCIRF recommendations that the U.S. government has implemented from USCIRF’s 2021 Annual Report, discussing human rights violations perpetrated based on the coercive enforcement of interpretations of religion, and providing details on individuals included in USCIRF’s Freedom or Religion or Belief (FoRB) Victims List and Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project.
Religious movements included in the report, being the target of religious discrimination by states are:
Baha’i – Buddhist Hoa Hao – Buddhist Tibetan – Catholics – Jehovah’s Witness – Orthodox – Protestant – Eckankar – Erfan-e Halgheh Practitioner – Falun Gong – Hindu – Humanist – Jewish – Muslim Ahmadiyya – Muslim Shi’a – Muslim Sufi – Muslim Sunni – Santeria – Church of Scientology – And others
JW World Headquarters (20.04.2022) – April 20, 2022 will mark five years since Russia’s Supreme Court criminalized the activity of Jehovah’s Witnesses, liquidated some 400 of their legal entities, and confiscated their houses of worship. Russian authorities have since jailed over 320 Witnesses, with over 80 still in prison.
The systematic persecution has escalated over the past year as prison sentences exponentially increased in frequency and in term length. Several Witnesses have also been tortured or severely beaten either while being interrogated or in prison.
Jarrod Lopes, spokesman for Jehovah’s Witnesses, states:
“It’s well-documented that Jehovah’s Witnesses endured decades of Soviet persecution. Ignoring this history, Russian authorities have inhumanely beaten, tortured, and imprisoned peaceful Jehovah’s Witnesses in a failed attempt to break their faith and eliminate them. Long after the Soviet regime fell, Jehovah’s Witnesses have continued to thrive and they will likewise outlive the current Russian administration.”
Below are the latest statistics as well as some quotes from international experts that you will find helpful if you chose to report on the anniversary of the ban.
April 20, 2017: Judge Ivanenko of Russia’s Supreme Court announces decision to shut down the legal entities of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia and Crimea
2017 Russian Supreme Court Ruling
· The April 20, 2022, Supreme Court ruling, albeit grossly unjust, simply liquidated all of the Witnesses’ legal entities, Local Religious Organizations (LROs), in Russia and Crimea, declaring them “extremist”. During the 2017 Supreme Court hearing, the Russian government claimed that individual Witnesses would be free to practice their faith. However, the government’s claim of allowing freedom to worship has been inconsistent with its actions.
· 1741 homes of Jehovah’s Witnesses have been raided, almost one per day
o 27 homes raided since February 24th Ukraine invasion
· 620 JWs involved in 289 criminal cases
o This includes 16 JWs in Crimea, 4 of whom are in prison (some after conviction have been transferred to prisons inside of Russia). All have been charged under prevailing Russian law
o Oldest involved in a criminal case is 87.5-year-old Yelena Zayschuk, she is 1 of 6 in their 80’s; there are 34 in their 70’s
· Over 450 added to Russia’s federal Rosfinmonitoring list of extremists and terrorists
o Many are placed on the list even before being criminally charged or tried—see Forum18
Beatings and Torture
For example:
· February 2019, Surgut, seven men tortured—suffocated, stripped naked, doused with water, and given electric shocks to their genitals—Link to confirmed report. Video interviews
· February 2020, Chita, one man beaten, choked, and given electric shocks to his stomach and leg—link to report
· February 2020, Orenburg, five men severely beaten in prison, with one man being hospitalized for broken rib and damaged kidney—link to report
· October 2021, Irkutsk, one man beaten while his wife screamed for them to stop, another was tortured—stripped naked, lifted and suspended off the ground by his arms behind his back, attempted to force a glass bottle in anus area—link to report. Video interviews
As if torturing a man and making him writhe in pain isn’t savage enough, many Russian officers will also resort to inhumanely threatening to have his wife raped.
· Why and how successful is it?
o Most often, Russian law enforcement officers have beaten or tortured Jehovah’s Witnesses to force them to divulge information about fellow believers and or bully them into giving up their faith. The overwhelming majority of men withstood the torture and never complied, even with the smallest demands for information. That’s why in most of the criminal cases, the authorities have resorted to planting a mole to infiltrate the congregation and leak the names, contact information, and worship activities of local Witnesses.
What Experts Are Saying
Natalia Prilutskaya, Russia researcher at Amnesty International, call on Russia to:
“to immediately and unconditionally release all Jehovah’s Witnesses arbitrarily deprived of freedom for their faith and to drop criminal charges against all peaceful believers. Those who have been subjected to criminal prosecution, torture and other ill-treatment, unlawful searchers of their properties, who have lost their jobs, must receive adequate compensation and have their rights restored.”
The world should have started paying more attention to prosecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia already five years ago. Arbitrary prosecution of peaceful believers on spurious charges of “extremism” was and is a litmus test of the lack of freedom in Russia and of the Russian government’s intentions to quash any dissent, anything that they see as a threat to their official narratives. While the world was watching repressions against dissenters being unleashed within Russia, its government was also quietly preparing to promote their world view with tanks and missiles on the territory of the neighboring country, Ukraine. Were there a stronger international reaction to persecutions inside Russia, including to persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses, the world could have been in a much better place today now. To prevent further escalation, it is important to expose and rigorously respond to human rights violations being committed in Russia. Restoring justice for one of the persecuted communities – Jehovah’s Witnesses – is one of the steps on the long road to restoring human rights and freedom in Russia and ensuring that no more international crisis, like the aggression against Ukraine, could be conceived in the Kremlin.”
Sir Andrew Wood, former British Ambassador to Russia (1995-2000), states:
“It follows that the punishment of peaceful believers on the grounds of their certification as extremists by the Russian Supreme Court in effect by demand of Russia’s current president is arbitrary and unjust. Their arrest, ill treatment, and confinement are a breach of elementary human rights together with the infringement of the freedom of all souls to seek their path to the truths of religion as best they may. The targeting of particularly vulnerable people of whatever gender or age adds to the injustice.”
“The people of Russia and those beyond them share an interest in the country’s future rule under the conditions of natural law. That is essential to its future beneficial evolution. The peaceful pursuit of religion is an essential element of that aspiration, whether in times of war like the present or in less dangerous circumstances. It therefore deserves our support as we hope and work for a better future.”
Dr. Emily Baran, expert on Russia and Soviet history, states:
“The history of Jehovah’s Witnesses, both in Russia and worldwide, makes clear that persecution will not have its intended purpose of eliminating this faith community. What persecution does is isolate Witnesses, subject them to cruel and senseless harassment, violence, and loss of freedom, and make their daily lives full of uncertainty. The Witnesses have demonstrated adaptability before, including in the Soviet period, and will continue to find ways to practice their faith even in these difficult conditions. Russian Witnesses will adapt because they have to, because they feel their faith requires it of them, and because repeated persecution has given them the skills to do so effectively.
More comments by the experts above can be downloaded here.
Russia Exporting Weaponization of Anti-Extremism Legislation
· Russia has been seeking ways to export its anti-extremism legislation, along with how to weaponize it
o May 2020, Putin signed a “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation”—“On Adopting a Strategy to Counteract Extremism in the Russian Federation Until 2025”
§ Section 32 on pg. 16, clearly outlines the President’s goals, in the field of international cooperation:
§ Strengthening the position of the Russian Federation in international organizations whose activity is aimed at counteracting extremism;
§ Promoting in bilateral and multilateral formats Russian initiatives in counteracting extremist activities, including over the Internet;
§ Signing agreements with foreign states aimed at solving problems in the realm of counteracting extremism;
§ Exchanging best practices in counteracting extremism, including cooperating together to develop international legal documents;
o Moscow-based rights advocate Sova Center published a report in 2020 confirming that
“Russian extremist legislation has been and remains the model anti-extremist legislation for Central Asian countries, despite the fact that, in recent years, it has been repeatedly criticized at the international level by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Venice Commission, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance of the Council of Europe, and other structures
In a resolution on 7 April 2022 about the increasing repression in Russia, including the case of Alexei Navalny, the European Parliament condemned the role of Moscow Patriarch Kirill in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Item 6 of the resolution states:
(See full resolution at the bottom of the article):
“Condemns the role of Moscow Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, in providing theological cover for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; praises the courage of the 300 priests of the Russian Orthodox Church who signed a letter condemning the aggression and expressed their grief over the ordeal of the Ukrainian people, calling for an end to the war.”
In parallel, priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate decided to appeal to the Cathedral of the Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches with a lawsuit against the Russian Patriarch Kirill for “committing moral crimes”. Priests of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine demand an international tribunal for the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill.
The statement of the priests was published by Fr Andrei Pinchuk on his Facebook page.
Excerpt:
“Today, when Patriarch Kirill of Moscow frankly supports Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine, we, the priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, have decided to appeal to the Council of Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches with a lawsuit against Patriarch Kirill.
Our main accusations:
1. Cyril preaches the doctrine of the “Russian world”, which does not correspond to Orthodox teaching and should be condemned as heresy;
2. Kirill committed moral crimes by blessing the war against Ukraine and fully supporting the aggressive actions of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine.
We hope that the Council of Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches will consider our appeal and make its fair decision,”
the appeal says.
See full resolution of the European Parliament below the video.
UATV interviewed on video a priest on the suit against Kirill
UATV, a Russian-language channel of the state foreign broadcasting of Ukraine, addressed to a wide foreign audience and designed “to convey to the whole world objective, relevant and interesting information from Ukraine and about Ukraine the first hand”, launched an interview with a high ranking orthodox priest. The video is presented with the following message:
“Russian World” – an ideology that laid the foundation of Russian hatred of Ukraine. Ukrainian priests of Moscow Patriarchate “filed a suit” to the highest church judicial authority calling to condemn the doctrine spread by the Russian Orthodox Church and its heretical leader – Patriarch Kirill
See the full resolution here:
(if reading the article in our non-English site, find below an automatic translation of the resolution)
Increasing repression in Russia, including the case of Alexey Navalny
European Parliament resolution of 7 April 2022 on the increasing repression in Russia, including the case of Alexei Navalny (2022/2622(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia,
– having regard to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders,
– having regard to the Constitution of the Russian Federation,
– having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell of 28 March 2022 on the Russian independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta,
– having regard to the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 22 March 2022 on the ruling to extend Alexei Navalny’s politically motivated imprisonment by an additional nine years,
– having regard to the statement by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights of 24 March 2022 expressing appreciation for the courageous work of journalists and human rights defenders, including those from the Russian Federation and Belarus,
– having regard to the statement by the Media Freedom Representative of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe of 3 March 2022 on the serious infringement of the right to freedom of expression and media freedom in Russia in the context of the country’s military attack against Ukraine,
– having regard to the statements by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the latest developments in Russia and Ukraine,
– having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the Russian Federation has repeatedly breached international law and its international commitments and has launched an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and perpetrated massacres against its citizens; whereas legislative restrictions, media bans, the criminalisation of independent reporting and free opinion, and other political prosecutions have reached a totalitarian scale in recent months, resulting in the disintegration of independent and pluralistic civil space in Russia;
B. whereas the Russian regime has intensified, in an unprecedented manner, its crackdown on peaceful protesters, independent journalists and bloggers, human rights defenders and civil society activists in an effort to silence any criticism of and opposition to its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine; whereas thousands have fled Russia due to the drastically increased risk of arbitrary arrest and prosecution; whereas this crackdown has had a devastating effect on the lives and freedoms of minorities, LGBTQI+ persons, women, and all people branded by the government and society as deviating from the behavioural or normative rules and expectations imposed or for criticising the regime and the policies of the Russian authorities;
C. whereas fundamental human rights, including freedom of association and freedom of expression, are enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as well as in numerous international legal instruments to which Russia has committed itself; whereas the Russian authorities are responsible for years of systematic propaganda campaigns against Ukraine, Europe and liberal democratic values, culminating in the eradication of any vestiges of a vibrant, politically active and independent civil society;
D. whereas since 24 February 2022, Russian authorities have arbitrarily detained more than 15 400 peaceful anti-war protesters across the country, subjecting some to severe ill‑treatment and other human rights violations; whereas more than 60 criminal cases have already been brought since then;
E. whereas numerous laws imposed over the past few years, such as the ‘foreign agents’ law and its variations, the regulation of and adjudication over so-called ‘extremist organisations’ and countless decrees by the regulator responsible for media oversight (Roskomnadzor) have been used by Russian authorities for their concentrated crackdown on independent civil society and media active in Russia, targeting in particular non-governmental organisations (NGOs), human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, as well as women’s rights, LGBTQI+ and environmental activists, and activists of ethnic and cultural minorities; whereas the imposition of all of this legislation, regulation and judicial and administrative burdens is forcing civil society actors to refuse foreign funding, engage in self-censorship and reduce both their public visibility and their activities for fear of state retaliation;
F. whereas on 4 March 2022, the Russian Parliament amended the Criminal Code to impose a penalty of up to 15 years in prison for spreading allegedly ‘fake’ information about the war in Ukraine; whereas on 22 March 2022, the law was broadened to criminalise the sharing of ‘fake news’ about any activities of Russia’s official bodies abroad; whereas on 4 March 2022, the Russian Duma banned demonstrations against the war in Ukraine; whereas the Russian legal reforms have introduced administrative and criminal offences for Russian nationals and legal entities who call for international sanctions against the Russian state, its nationals or any Russian legal entities;
G. whereas Russian authorities have forced several independent media outlets to suspend their activities, close down, or move their activities abroad, while blocking access to others in the context of growing internet censorship, control and isolation, thereby depriving the Russian population of unbiased information about Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war crimes being committed there in the name of the Russian Federation; whereas these include, most notably, the radio station Echo of Moscow, the TV station Dozhd and the newspaper Novaya Gazeta; whereas the authorities have blocked foreign social media in Russia and blacklisted Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, labelling it as ‘extremist’;
H. whereas since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine, hundreds of journalists, human rights defenders, activists and others have left Russia due to the drastically increased risk of arbitrary arrest and prosecution, including after President Putin referred to those standing up against the war as ‘national traitors’ and a ‘fifth column’;
I. whereas on 16 March 2022, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided to revoke the membership of the Russian Federation in the Council of Europe, effective immediately; whereas the Russian Federation, for its part, decided to leave the Council of Europe on 15 March 2022, depriving Russian citizens of the protection enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and denying them access to judicial remedies before the European Court of Human Rights;
J. whereas Alexei Navalny, a Russian lawyer, opposition politician and anti-corruption activist, and laureate of the 2021 Sakharov Prize, was arrested in January 2021 and has been in prison since February 2021, where he has been serving an arbitrary, politically motivated sentence and has been repeatedly subjected to torture and inhumane treatment; whereas the EU has condemned the poisoning and politically motivated imprisonment of Alexei Navalny in the strongest possible terms, imposed targeted sanctions and continues to demand an independent investigation into his poisoning;
K. whereas on 22 March 2022, Moscow’s Lefortovski Court, following an extraordinary session staged in a prison camp and thus outside regular court facilities, sentenced Alexei Navalny to nine years in a maximum security prison and issued him with an administrative fine of RUB 1,2 million (approximately EUR 12 838); whereas this judgment clearly contravenes international law and the Russian Constitution and is as unlawful, arbitrary and politically motivated as the previous judgment;
L. whereas a number of activists have been threatened with or subjected to arrest and prosecution for supporting or working with Alexei Navalny or for supporting his ideas, like the smart voting strategy; whereas they were accused and prosecuted for such support based on the retroactive application of new laws or administrative decisions on the basis of their social media statements, and many of them have left Russia after facing criminal charges; whereas Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation was labelled ‘extremist’;
1. Condemns the Russian regime’s domestic repression, which has worsened in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; demands that Russian authorities stop the harassment, intimidation and attacks against all anti-war protesters, independent civil society organisations, NGOs, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, as well as women’s rights, LGBTQI+ and environmental activists in Russia; expresses its solidarity with the democratic forces in Russia committed to an open and free society, and underlines its support for all individuals and organisations which have been the target of attacks and repression;
2. Condemns the neo-totalitarian, imperialist ideological stance cultivated by the Russian Government and its propagandists; emphasises that the assault against democracy and disregard for the rights of other nations has paved Russia’s path towards despotism, international aggression and war crimes; underscores that an undemocratic Russia is a constant threat to Europe’s security and stability;
3. Deplores Russian legislation, including on ‘foreign agents’, the changes to the Criminal Code introduced on 4 March and 22 March 2022, and the Mass Media Law, which are used to engage in judicial harassment against dissenting voices in the country and abroad and to undermine independent media; underscores that these developments are in blatant contradiction with the commitments Russia has voluntarily undertaken under international law and written into its own Constitution;
4. Denounces the continuous and increasing censorship by Russian authorities, including of the internet, and urges them to immediately put an end to their control and censorship;
5. Condemns Russian authorities’ behaviour in persecuting the mothers of Russian soldiers and their established organisations, depriving Russian parents of information on the whereabouts of their children and refusing to cooperate with Ukrainian authorities in order to return the remains of Russian soldiers killed in action;
6. Condemns the role of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for providing theological cover for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; praises the courage of the 300 priests of the Russian Orthodox Church who have signed a letter condemning the aggression, grieving over the ordeal of the Ukrainian people and asking to “stop the war”;
7. Strongly condemns the imprisonment of the Sakharov Prize laureate Alexei Navalny and reiterates its call for his immediate and unconditional release, as well as of the hundreds of other Russian citizens baselessly detained merely for having the courage to demonstrate in favour of democracy and peace or to improve their rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; calls on the Russian authorities to improve conditions in prisons and detention facilities in order to meet international standards; considers Alexei Navalny’s humanitarian, health and safety situation a priority concern for the EU; calls on the Russian authorities to take all necessary measures to fully secure his rights during his unlawful detention; condemns the fact that the trial against Alexei Navalny did not respect his right to a fair trial and reiterates its call for a transparent investigation into the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, without delay;
8. Considers the repression against Alexei Navalny, his supporters, the media and civil society, all intended as part of a prelude to Russia’s criminal war of aggression, and reiterates that political pluralism and free media are the best safeguards against and obstacles to international aggression by an undemocratic government; considers that our efforts to support freedom of opinion and the media for Russian citizens are an intrinsic part of our efforts to combat the war and aggression in Ukraine;
9. Forcefully condemns the decisions by Russian courts leading to the closure of International Memorial and the Memorial Human Rights Centre, together one of Russia’s oldest and most prominent human rights organisations and a Sakharov Prize laureate; condemns the continued warnings by Roskomnadzor against Novaya Gazeta concerning censorship and alleged violations of the ‘foreign agents’ law, resulting in the newspaper’s announcement to cease operations until the end of the war in Ukraine; equally deplores the Russian Prosecutor-General’s request for Roskomnadzor to restrict access to Echo of Moscow and Dozhd due to their coverage of the war in Ukraine; commends the role played by these outlets, as well as so many other independent organisations and news outlets that have since been closed down, in uncovering the truth and providing facts about the crimes of the Soviet regime and the Russian Government, as well as their commitment to human rights; calls for an end to the systematic repression of journalistic institutions and independent media, which constitute the fundamental pillars of freedom and democracy;
10. Calls on the UN Human Rights Council to investigate in full and as a matter of urgency the abuses of the right to information and freedom of expression perpetrated by the Russian regime;
11. Expresses deep concern over how the crackdown on Russian civil society, human rights defenders, women’s rights activists, sexual and reproductive health and rights activists and LGBTQI+ communities is further exacerbating the situation of already vulnerable and targeted groups in the country;
12. Reiterates that the free and independent work of civil society organisations and the media is a cornerstone of a democratic society; calls on Russia, therefore, to establish a clear legal framework as well as a safe environment for civil society organisations, protesters, media and political actors in line with Russia’s Constitution and international obligations and with international human rights standards, enabling them to carry out their legitimate and useful work without interference; stresses the need to guarantee efficient legal recourse for protesters, civil society activists and journalists whose fundamental rights have been violated;
13. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States to closely monitor the human rights situation in Russia, to provide emergency assistance and to increase support for the civil society, independent NGOs, human rights defenders and independent media which remain active in Russia, including sustainable and flexible financial assistance; calls on the EU Delegation and the Member States’ representations in Russia to publicly show solidarity with those persecuted;
14. Urges the Commission and the Member States to strengthen protection for the rights and physical integrity of activists, independent journalists and human rights defenders targeted by the Russian authorities’ repression, and to provide them with emergency visas to enable them to leave the country and find temporary shelter in the EU, as well as to allow threatened or banned Russian NGOs and media to immediately continue their work from EU territory if needed;
15. Calls on the VP/HR and the Council to make effective use of the EU’s global human rights sanctions mechanism and impose restrictive measures on all Russian officials involved in the crackdown against independent civil society and media and peaceful protesters, as well as in this latest case against Alexei Navalny;
16. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to prevent and counter the spread of disinformation, including propaganda, and strengthen independent media; welcomes, therefore, the development of specific platforms and news in Russian and Ukrainian; calls for EU strategic communications to be improved and for an exploration of effective ways to counter war propaganda originating in Russia from outlets such as Rossija, Channel One Russia and NTV, which disseminate content approving of the war of aggression and misinforming people about it; calls on the Member States, the Commission and the EEAS to continue to enhance alternative online Russian-language information on the unfolding developments to counter disinformation, to continue to ensure that public statements from the EU and the Member States are translated into Russian and to address Russian-speaking audiences and platforms;
17. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to host banned media teams in the EU and to develop a joint platform for media in exile, as well as to support technologies that enable people to use the internet to exercise their fundamental rights, in particular the freedom of information and expression, and to support the pursuit of democracy and the rule of law, by establishing technological means to circumvent communication surveillance and the blocking of websites and applications in Russia, including low-tech via M-waves, a VPN Russia platform, anonymisation networks and satellite TV;
18. Calls on the EU Delegation and national diplomatic representations in Russia to closely monitor the situation on the ground and how trials are handled and to offer those concerned any support that they may need, including direct financial assistance to pay for lawyers and experts; calls on all governments to refuse any future extradition requests for Russian nationals for offences under the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences;
19. Urges the Member States, the Council and the Commission to secure humanitarian status and create safe migration possibilities for threatened Russian opposition, civil society and media representatives, including securing opportunities for them to enjoy long-term residence and work in the European Union; calls on the Member States to devise a mechanism to protect Russian soldiers who decide to defect; calls on financial institutions, banks, credit card companies and government authorities to introduce screening procedures for the tailored application of sanctions against Russian citizens in the EU in order to allow opposition activists, independent civil society and media representatives to retain access to their financial assets necessary to secure their existence in the European Union;
20. Recalls that academic and cultural collaboration at an individual level, even in times of conflict, may help to strengthen pluralistic voices in anti-democratic circumstances and serve as a basis for facilitating the re-establishment of relationships after the conflict; underlines that the Russian scientific community has been a primary target of repression by Putin’s regime;
21. Stresses the strategic value of the input of Russian academics who oppose the war in order to better analyse Putin’s regime and how to counter it; calls for an EU strategy to allow Russian students and professors to officially continue their studies and work in European universities, particularly in humanitarian disciplines, and to receive their corresponding diplomas;
22. Asks the EEAS, the Commission and the Member States to mainstream human rights and civil society consultation across all dialogues between the EU, its Member States and Russia, and to abide by their commitment to gender mainstreaming;
23. Calls for the EU and the Member States to continue to engage with the people of Russia and with Russian civil society in exile; urges the EU to demonstrate its readiness to support Russian civil society in its efforts to build a democratic Russia, and to welcome a democratic and responsible Russia back into the international community;
24. Calls for the EU to appoint a special envoy for a democratic Russia, who should be responsible for relations with the Russian people, in particular with democracy defenders in exile and those who have remained in Russia and want the country to return to the path of democracy;
25. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the EEAS, to help establish and support a Democratic Russia Hub for continuous dialogue with the democratic Russian community, in particular the anti-war committee established by Russian democratic opposition activists, in order to provide direct communication with the Russian people, to develop together with civil society an EU strategy for a future democratic Russia, to improve the integration of new emigrants from Russia through educational programmes, and to organise annual EU summits with democratic Russia in exile;
26. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to take coordinated action with like-minded countries to raise awareness of and push back against the restrictions of fundamental freedoms and human rights by the Russian authorities, including through high-level and public interventions, coordinated démarches, sustained scrutiny at international and regional human rights forums, as well as regular human rights impact assessments to ensure that engagement with Russia does not undermine human rights objectives and does not contribute, directly or indirectly, to human rights violations;
27. Notes that according to the Levada Center, 83 % of Russians support Putin’s war in Ukraine, while the percentage of Russians who say the country is moving in the right direction has risen from 52 % to 69 %, the highest level ever recorded since 1996; applauds, in this regard, those brave individuals who openly protest and oppose Russian imperialism in its newest form – the invasion of Ukraine – despite the brutality of the rioting policy, as well as media and social pressure; urges EU citizens, nevertheless, not to equate all Russian citizens with the brutal actions of their leadership and military in Ukraine; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support and protect the critical voices within the Russian diaspora who are facing threats from Russian authorities; condemns rallies organised by Russian diasporas in support of the war or in protest against the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees;
28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.
The decision-making body of the Council has started its review process of a controversial drafted text that aim at protecting human rights and dignity of persons who are subjected to coercive measures in psychiatry. The text however has been the subject of widespread and consistent criticism since the work on it started several years ago. The United Nations human rights mechanism has pointed to the legal incompatibility with an existing UN human rights convention, that outlaw the use of these discriminatory and potentially abusive and humiliating practices in psychiatry. UN human rights experts has expressed a shock that the Council of Europe with the work on this new legal instrument that allows the use of these practices under certain conditions might “reverse all positive developments in Europe”. This criticism has been strengthened by voices within the Council of Europe itself, international disability and mental health groups and many others.
“CRPD is the most comprehensive instrument protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. It is also the starting point for the Swedish disability policy,” he added.
He stressed that Sweden is a strong supporter and advocate for the full enjoyment of human rights by persons with disabilities, including the right to effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others.
Discrimination on the grounds of disability should not occur
Mr Mårten Ehnberg noted that “Discrimination on the grounds of disability should not occur anywhere in society. Health care must be offered to everyone based on need and on equal terms. Care must be provided with respect of the individual patient’s needs. This is of course also applicable regarding psychiatric care.”
With this he puts his finger on the sore spot. The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – the UN Committee that monitors the implementation of the CRPD – during the first part of the drafting process of this possible new legal text of the Council of Europe issued a written statement to the Council of Europe. The Committee stated that: “The Committee would like to highlight that involuntary placement or institutionalization of all persons with disabilities, and particularly of persons with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities, including persons with ‘‘mental disorders’’, is outlawed in international law by virtue of article 14 of the Convention, and constitutes arbitrary and discriminatory deprivation of liberty of persons with disabilities as it is carried out on the basis of actual or perceived impairment.”
To make any doubts on the question whether this concern all coercive psychiatric treatment, the UN Committee added, “The Committee would like to recall that involuntary institutionalization and involuntary treatment, which are grounded on therapeutic or medical necessity, do not constitute measures for protecting the human rights of persons with disabilities, but they are an infringement of persons with disabilities’ rights to liberty and security and their right to physical and mental integrity.”
Parliamentary assembly opposed
The UN does not stand alone. Mr Mårten Ehnberg told the European Times that “The Council of Europe’s work with the current drafted text (additional protocol) has previously been opposed by, inter alia, the Parliament of the Council of Europe (PACE), which on two occasions has recommended the Committee of Ministers to withdraw the proposal to draw up this protocol, on the basis that such an instrument, according to PACE, would be incompatible with the member states’ human rights obligations.”
Mr Mårten Ehnberg to this noted, that the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers in turn had stated that “the utmost should be done to promote alternatives to involuntary measures but that such measures nevertheless, subject to strict protective conditions, may be justified in exceptional situations where there is a risk of serious damage to the health of the person concerned or to others.”
With this he quoted a statement that had been formulated in 2011, and has been used since by those who speak in favour of the drafted legal text.
It was originally formulated as part of the initial consideration whether a Council of Europe text regulating the use of coercive measures in psychiatry would be necessary or not.
During this early phase of the deliberation a Statement on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was drafted by the Council of Europe Committee on Bioethics. While seemingly concerning the CRPD the statement however factually only considers the Committee’s own Convention, and its reference work – the European Convention on Human Rights, referring to them as “international texts”.
The statement has been noted as rather deceptive. It lays out that the Council of Europe Committee on Bioethics considered the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, particularly whether articles 14, 15 and 17 were compatible with “the possibility to subject under certain conditions a person who has a mental disorder of a serious nature to involuntary placement or involuntary treatment, as foreseen in other national and international texts.” The statement then confirms this.
Comparative text on the key point in the statement of the Committee on Bioethics however show it in reality does not consider the CRPD’s text or spirit, but only text straight out of the Committee’s own convention:
The Council of Europe Committee’s Statement on the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: “Involuntary treatment or placement may only be justified, in connection with a mental disorder of a serious nature, if from the absence of treatment or placement serious harm is likely to result to the person’s health or to a third party.”
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Article 7: “Subject to protective conditions prescribed by law, including supervisory, control and appeal procedures, a person who has a mental disorder of a serious nature may be subjected, without his or her consent, to an intervention aimed at treating his or her mental disorder only where, without such treatment, serious harm is likely to result to his or her health.”
Further preparation of the drafted text
Mr Mårten Ehnberg, said that during the continued preparations, Sweden will continue to monitor that the necessary protective principles are upheld.
He stressed that, “It is not acceptable if compulsory care is used in a way that means that persons with disabilities, including psychosocial disabilities, are discriminated against and treated in an unacceptable way.”
He added that the Swedish Government is highly committed, both nationally and internationally, to further improve the enjoyment of human rights by persons with mental ill-health and disabilities, including psychosocial disabilities, as well as to promote the development of voluntary, community-based support and services.
He finished off noting, that the Swedish Government’s work regarding the rights of persons with disabilities will continue unabated.
In Finland the government also follow the process closely. Ms Krista Oinonen, Director of the Unit for Human Rights Courts and Conventions, Ministry for Foreign Affairs told the European Times, that: “Throughout the drafting process, Finland has also sought a constructive dialogue with civil society actors, and the Government is keeping Parliament duly informed. The Government has lately organised an extensive round of consultations among a large group of relevant authorities, CSOs and human rights actors.”
Ms Krista Oinonen could not give a conclusive viewpoint on the drafted possible legal text, as in Finland, the discussion about the draft text is still ongoing.
Thirty years after the siege of Sarajevo, the UN team in Bosnia and Herzegovina reiterated the importance on Wednesday of pursuing justice and reparation for victims, survivors and their family members.
The siege began after Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in the wake of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.
Bosnian Serbs largely opposed independence, while the other two large ethnic groups, Muslim Bosniaks and Croats, favoured the split from Belgrade.
Bosnian Serb troops started bombarding the capital city in April 1992, a sustained assault which lasted for nearly four years.
This was the longest blockade since the Second World War, with more than 12,000 people killed, and marked a key moment in the Bosnian War.
Fighting denial of atrocities
The UN Resident Coordinator for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ingrid Macdonald, has met with survivors’ associations across the country.
Ms. Macdonald continues to spotlight the importance of countering the denial of atrocity crimes and glorification of war criminals,said UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric, speaking during his daily briefing from New York.
“She said that such rhetoric perpetuates the suffering of survivors and families of victims and has no place in a democratic society,” Mr. Dujarric told journalists.
Belgium was condemned for discriminating against Jehovah’s Witnesses. Failure to grant congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses exemption from property tax in the Brussels-Capital Region since 2018 was discriminatory
a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) read in conjunction with Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the European Convention on Human Rights and with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the Convention.
The case concerned congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses which complained of being denied exemption from payment of a property tax (précompte immobilier) in respect of properties in the Brussels-Capital Region used by them for religious worship. According to an order of 23 November 2017 enacted by the legislature of the Brussels-Capital Region, as of the 2018 fiscal year the exemption applied only to “recognised religions”, a category that did not include the applicant congregations.
The Court held that since the tax exemption in question was contingent on prior recognition, governed by rules that did not afford sufficient safeguards against discrimination, the difference in treatment to which the applicant congregations had been subjected had no reasonable and objective justification. It noted, among other points, that recognition was only possible on the initiative of the Minister of Justice and depended thereafter on the purely discretionary decision of the legislature. A system of this kind entailed an inherent risk of arbitrariness, and religious communities could not reasonably be expected, in order to claim entitlement to the tax exemption in issue, to submit to a process that was not based on minimum guarantees of fairness and did not guarantee an objective assessment of their claims.
Nazism in Ukraine – Sociologist Massimo Introvigne has just published, in his already popular online magazine BitterWinter.ORG, a series of articles with in-depth research to separate facts from fiction, about the propaganda that is trying to portray Ukraine as Nazified country.
See the excellent series of 7 articles published by Massimo Introvigne: Nazism in Ukraine – Separating Facts from Fiction.
A main argument of Russian propaganda in the current Ukrainian war is that Ukraine is under the decisive influence of “Nazis” and needs to be “denazified.” The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is Jewish, which makes any claims that he heads a “Nazi government” paradoxical. However, the Russians insist that Nazis are a significant part of those fighting against pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass, and that Ukraine keeps lionizing those who collaborated with the Nazis during World War II. The Ukrainians counter that there are quite a few Nazis fighting “for” the pro-Russian Donbass separatists rather than against them. Read the full article by clicking on the title above.
The main argument used by Russians to prove that present-day Ukrainians have Nazi sympathies are the honors officially tributed to nationalist leader Stepan Bandera (1909–1959). Putin’s Russia has inherited from the Soviets the use of “Banderist” as synonym for “Ukrainian Nazi.” The story, however, is somewhat more complicated. Read the full article by clicking on the title above.
Ukraine became independent in 1991. By then, there were few who had been involved in significant ways in the Nazi German occupation of Ukraine who were still alive. Many had been executed in Soviet times; others had escaped abroad or died of old age. However, small neo-Nazi groups emerged, as they did in most European countries, among young people who had never encountered German Nazism. Read the full article by clicking on the title above.
There is a propaganda war around neo-Nazism in Ukraine, and it is a war where intelligence services play their usual roles. Not many outside Ukraine are familiar with the story of Eduard Kovalenko, but it is a perfect illustration of how Russian disinformation works on this issue. Read the full article by clicking on the title above
Those who have heard of Nazis in Ukraine have certainly heard of the Azov Battalion, which is presented often by Russian and pro-Russian propaganda as the smoking gun proving that the Ukrainian government promotes Nazism. Read the full article by clicking on the title above
Putin has repeatedly indicated that “denazification” of Ukraine is one of the aims of its war. One can ask, however, whether, before denazifying other countries, he should not put his own house in order. Neo-Nazism is not a peculiar Ukrainian phenomenon. It exists in all European countries, and Russia is no exception. Read the full article by clicking on the title above
It is now time to draw some conclusions from the six articles I have devoted to the question of Nazism in Ukraine. They show, I believe, that Russian propaganda is just propaganda, and war propaganda is rarely informative. Read the full article by clicking on the title above
The last few weeks seem to have demonstrated, on the one hand, that an armed confrontation between Russia and NATO countries is out of the question and, on the other hand, that international sanctions alone will not be enough to force Moscow to stop the invasion of Ukraine. So who can stop Vladimir Putin in this war (or in his future wars)? The answer is single: the Russian people.
However, it is obvious that the Russian people will not be able to do this tomorrow morning. And no external force will be able to push them to oppose the Kremlin regime en masse in the immediate future. But, in the end, real changes in Russia will take place only when the society strongly demands freedom and a dignified life. That is why it is essential to study in detail how Russians are reacting to Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine.
Russia: many arrests during anti-war demonstrations – FRANCE 24, 6 March 2022
Control of power over society
In his 22 years in power, Putin has succeeded in creating a resilient repressive system. The power vertical tightly controls political life and public expression throughout the country, so that for years a large majority of Russians have preferred to assert themselves “outside politics” in order not to risk losing their jobs, their physical integrity, their freedom or even their lives – and, at the same time, in order not to admit that, in the face of power, they feel powerless and weak.
This sense of fear and helplessness is compounded by incessantly hammered propaganda, which is being deployed in a media landscape that the government has finished cleaning up in recent weeks. This propaganda has convinced a large part of the population that the president has no choice but to launch a “special military operation” in Ukraine to save Russia from destruction.
Yet the invasion of Ukraine has not generated euphoria in Russia comparable to that seen in spring 2014 following the annexation of Crimea. Despite surveys that announce 70% popular support for the “special operation”-but which cannot be taken seriously given the Russian government’s total control over polls-there is a lack of enthusiasm about the war among the Russian population.
Supporting actions are mainly organized by administrations, and the people who take part in them are, most often, civil servants.
For example, in universities, administrations have staged videos of students expressing their support for Putin; in several public elementary school, teachers have arranged groups of children to form the letter Z (which has become the symbol of the invasion of Ukraine); in St. Petersburg, on the famous Nevsky Prospect, a police band played patriotic songs at the top of its lungs to disrupt anti-war demonstrators; in some cities, municipal bus drivers were forced to put a Z sign on their vehicles.
On March 18, 2022, the Kremlin organized a large concert in the Luzhniki Stadium on the eighth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea to show public support for the war in Ukraine.According to official data, nearly 200,000 people attended. Testimonies of participants later revealed that many of them were forced to come (under threat of being fired) and many were paid.
Journalist is asking Z-attendees "Friends, wanna give a small comment – what does this day mean for you?" They turn away in silence. He insists – they shake their heads and refuse to answer. Finally he asks – why did you come? Response "They pushed us into a bus and brought here" pic.twitter.com/3UswR4nL6o
In reality, all these actions do not tell us anything about the public opinion in Russia. For the moment, we can only see the mosaic of different trends in Russian society.
Fear and denial
The first trend is fear and denial in Russian society. An example of the fear caused by the all-out repression unleashed by the government against all those who contest the war: in mid-March, an attempt to conduct a realistic survey on the population’s perception of the war had edifying results. Of the 31,000 people the agency was able to reach by phone, almost 29,000 hung up as soon as they realized they were going to be asked about the “special operation” in Ukraine (usually, the proportion of people refusing to answer telephone polls is three to five times lower).
Much of the denial is due to the success of the propaganda mentioned above. After the closure of the last few media outlets open to alternative views to the government’s, most Russians found themselves in an information bubble. The state-controlled media are broadcasting an extremely biased interpretation, hiding the real information about the Russian offensive on Ukrainian towns and villages, presenting Ukrainians as hostages of a Nazi clique and claiming that it is the Ukrainian army and volunteer battalions that are themselves firing missiles at residential buildings in their country and blaming the destruction on the Russians – who, for their part, are allegedly extremely careful to spare civilians.
Some Russians, especially those who have installed VPNs on their computers and smartphones, have access to sources of information inaccessible to their compatriots, know that the reality is different from the image presented on television. But even these people rarely have the courage to discuss it with their relatives, friends and colleagues.
Anonymous denunciations, widespread under the USSR, have become commonplace again. The fear of arrest has begun to destroy horizontal social ties and has atomized society, making collective resistance impossible.
Soviet reflexes The second trend is precisely the emergence of Soviet reflexes in the Russian population. The “homo sovieticus” was thought to have disappeared with the fall of the USSR, but it seems that its burial was premature.
In addition to the anonymous reports already mentioned, the ideas of nationalization of foreign companies that have decided to suspend their activities in Russia, the introduction of strict price controls by the state, or the expropriation of property owned by the “enemies of the people” who left the national territory after the beginning of the “special military operation” are often brandished by those who support the war in Ukraine.
More directly, direct references to the USSR are flourishing. Tanks on their way to Ukraine are flying Soviet flags. During the concert that the Kremlin organized on March 18, 2022 in Moscow to show popular support for the president, the main song was “Made in the Soviet Union” (which starts with “Ukraine and Crimea, Belarus and Moldova… That’s my country!” before adding a little later “Kazakhstan and the Caucasus, and the Baltic too!”).
Kremlin crooner Oleg Gazmanov at the pro-war rally Putin went to yesterday singing “Ukraine and Crimea, Belarus and Moldova, that is my country.” This clip was sent to me by an acquaintance in Chișinău where it’s being shared with increasing alarm. pic.twitter.com/DHoyiyojX1
Today’s deeply corrupt and kleptocratic Russian system, run by an elite that generally uses the embezzled money to afford a luxurious lifestyle, has little to do with any communist ideal. Nevertheless, the country’s current leaders, most of whom are old enough to have been trained and educated in the USSR, are happy to use typical Soviet propaganda.
Thus, in September 2021, on the Facebook page of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to justify the idea that Russia has never attacked another country (a fundamental element of the Kremlin’s propaganda) the partition of Poland by Germany and the USSR in 1939 was simply presented as a “liberating expedition” by the Red Army – a vision in line with the one propagated in the USSR and taken up on several occasions by Vladimir Putin, who did not hesitate to rehabilitate the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
Young against old
The third trend at work is the growing generation gap in Russia.
Many young Russians are opposed to this war. They are the ones who come out in the streets the most, they are the ones who are most often arrested by the police during demonstrations. Students confide on social networks and sometimes to their teachers that the hardest thing for them today is to talk to their own parents, who are either indoctrinated by television or paralyzed by fear of repression, and therefore pressure their children to keep them quiet.
Modern Russian youth is largely globalized and open to dialogue with other cultures. They live like Western youth: they listen to the same music, watch the same series, love the same brands and use the same formulas (lol, crush, chill, etc.). This trend may contribute to the evolution of Russian society in the future – but not in the immediate future.
What about the intelligentsia?
It is impossible to understand Russian society without mentioning the intelligentsia. The philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev said that writers and poets are the conscience of the nation and best represent the real Russia. Today, we can see that a large majority of the Russian intelligentsia is radically opposed to the war that Putin has unleashed.
These include writer Boris Akunin, director Andrei Zviaguintsev, writer Lyudmila Ulitskaya, actress Shulpan Khamatova, writer Dmitry Glukhovsky, as well as Russian youth idols such as singers Oxxxymiron, Monetochka, Face, Noize MC, and the country’s most popular blogger, Yuri Dud. Most of them have already left Russia.
Report on the “Russians against war” concert organized by Oxxxymiron in Istanbul, CNN, 18 March 2022.
All of them take up positive ideas intrinsic to Russian culture: the value of individual freedom sung by Alexander Pushkin, the absurdity of a harmony built on even a single tear of a child, as expressed by Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and the rejection of violence that Leo Tolstoy placed at the heart of his philosophy.
The Russian people have always been slightly out of step with their intelligentsia. Nevertheless, they have always managed to reunite with it. It will still take time for the whole population to become aware of the tragedy that is currently taking place. How long? That is the uncertainty. What is certain is that only after a critical analysis of the Putin regime and the expurgation of the hatred it has infused into Russian society can real changes take place.
